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HEALTHCARE JOINT VENTURES: PUSHING
TAX-EXEMPT LAW TO THE LIMITS?
By Eileen M. Newell*

INTRODUCTION

Numerous organizations operate hospitals, clinics or associations,
bringing all aspects of healthcare to a broad sector of the community.'
Hundreds of these entities operate hospitals as nonprofit entities, on a
tax-exempt basis,2 usually providing, at a minimum, emergency care to the

entire community regardless of an individual's ability to pay.' In addition,
countless organizations and associations provide research and education
in the healthcare field. While healthcare organizations are not the only
classification of tax-exempt organizations,4 healthcare providers are at an

* J.D. 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.B.A. 1998, Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame, IN. The author thanks her
family for their inspiration and encouragement, Professor Karla Simon for her
guidance and George Rendziperis, Esq. for his assistance with the preparation of
this article.
1. In 1997, the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities ("NTEE") classified
nearly sixteen percent of all nonprofit charitable organizations as health
organizations. These health entities, collectively reported assets and revenue
totaling in value of $506,640,000,000 and $395,165,000,000. See Paul Arnsberger,
Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 1997, STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULL. 50 (2000).
2. To encourage the operation of certain activities that benefit the
community, the Internal Revenue Code provides for exemption from income tax
on income generated from designated exempt activities. See I.R.C. § 501 (West
2000).
3. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2C.B. 111. However, an emergency room is not
an absolute requirement for tax exemption. See also Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B.
94, stating that the lack of an emergency room would not preclude the eligibility
for tax-exempt status if an emergency room would be unpractical because the
specialized nature of certain hospitals.
4. The NTEE breaks down the Nonprofit Charitable Organization sector into
ten categories: (1) arts, culture, and humanities; (2) education; (3) environment,
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increased risk of losing the exempt status, due to the high-profile nature
of its industry Undoubtedly, the laws regarding nonprofit organizations
and the tax-exempt status,6 which may or may not be granted to a
nonprofit organization, have a tremendous impact on the administration
of healthcare.
Often, a nonprofit organization is willing to contract with a for-profit
entity in order to generate the funding necessary to provide healthcare to
the community.
In such a relationship, for-profit organizations are
attempting to decrease costs and increase revenue, which ultimately
provides a greater rate of return for investors. Regardless of the entity's
philosophy behind offering its services, healthcare providers try to find
the most efficient and effective means to operate their facilities. As a
result, new combinations of joint ventures and alliances between
nonprofit and for-profit entities emerge, commonly in the form of a

animals; (4) health; (5) human services; (6) international, foreign affairs; (7)
mutual, membership benefit; (8) public, societal benefit; (9) religion related; and
(10) unknown, unclassified. See Arnsberger, supra note 1, at 50.
5. See THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS §1.1 (John Wiley & Sons 1995).
6. While these two terms, "nonprofit" and "tax-exempt", are used as
synonyms, a difference does exist. The term "nonprofit" generally refers to
section of the state law in which an organization seeks incorporation. Almost all
states have enacted a form of nonprofit corporate law. See JAMES J. FISHMAN &
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 64 (2d ed. 2000). The term

"tax-exempt" deals specifically with organizations that have received an
exemption from a form of taxation by federal and state officials. Although most
tax-exempt organizations incorporate as nonprofits, a nonprofit is not
automatically tax-exempt. To gain tax-exempt status for federal income tax
purposes under I.R.C. §501, an organization must file Form 1023 with the Internal
Revenue Service. See I.R.S. Publication 557 (Rev. July 2001), Tax-Exempt Status
for Your Organization,Cat. No. 46573C, 2.
7. Additional and more specific reasons for a nonprofit to enter into a jointventure include:
[T]o grant physicians a stake in a new enterprise or service...; to bring a
new service or medical facility to a needy area; to share the risk that is
inherent in anew enterprise; to pool diverse areas of medical expertise; to
attract new patient admissions and referrals; to persuade physicians not
to refer patient elsewhere; and to ensure that physicians do not establish
a competing healthcare provider.
See
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partnership or a limited liability company (LLC).
Initially, the Internal Revenue Service 9 was hesitant to allow these
agreements, fearing it would compromise the integrity of the tax-exempt
status. 0 After realizing the prohibition on these ventures was hindering
the success of nonprofit entities in the world of big business, the Service
reconsidered its position." Consequently, nonprofit hospitals and clinics
began to form partnerships to survive in the world of managed healthcare.
The structures of these ventures have taken various forms, including
"whole hospital" and "ancillary" joint ventures. 2 With recent holdings by
the IRS and the courts, the boundaries of these ventures are only now
being determined; thus, providing uncertainty to those who wish to enter
into these agreements.
This Comment addresses the effect
of joint ventures on the tax-exempt
• • 13
status of nonprofit healthcare entities. Section I provides an overview of
the requirements for tax-exemption, as laid out in the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC). Section II discusses the reluctance of the IRS to permit
exempt organizations to enter into joint ventures with non-exempt
entities. Section II then summarizes the brief, but controversial, history of
joint ventures. Section III gives a detailed analysis of common healthcare
joint ventures. Section IV addresses the recent attempts to limit joint

8. Even though partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs) are
treated as flow-through entities for tax purposes, the LLC may be a more
attractive option, since the investor is not personally liable for the actions of the
LLC. Similar to a corporation, the investor is only liable for the actions of the
LLC up to the amount invested. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr §303 (1996).

9. The Internal Revenue Service will be referred to as "IRS" or "The
Service."
10. The IRS serves as guardian on behalf of the community for assets that are
donated to charitable organizations.
11. See Off. Mem. 19225, EE-7-80 (Mar. 13, 1980). See also Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
12. These types of joint ventures will be discussed in detail in Section III of
this article.
13. While this Comment deals only with the tax exemption granted by the
Internal Revenue Service, an exempt organization should also examine the
treatment of joint ventures with for-profit entities by state and local governments.
The state and local governments provide tax exemption to a qualifying nonprofit
for taxes they impose, such as, but not limited to property tax and state income
tax. See generally Kenneth D. Chestek, Are Hospitals Purely Public Charities?,7
ASSESSMENT J. 2 (2000).
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ventures, thus affecting the ability of nonprofit and healthcare
organizations to remain competitive in the industry.
I.

TAX-EXEMPTION FOR HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS

Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC provides an exemption from federal
income tax for organizations that promote a charitable, scientific or
educational purpose."
From the initial enactment of this section,
hospitals have been viewed as traditional charities and have qualified for
the exemption. In the Nineteenth Century, the wealthy enjoyed the
luxury of a "house-call" from the local physician, who generally worked
out of the home. 6 For the less fortunate, hospitals provided health
services when the wages of a private physician could not be paid. 7 The
generosity and benevolence of charitable donors funded hospitals. I
Unfortunately, hospitals were not known for providing extensive medical
services. In many cases, the hospital was a place to provide comfort for
those sick and close to death. '9 However, the indigent had no other
alternative.
As medical technology developed during the Twentieth Century, so did
the need for collective resources. 0 Physicians turned to hospitals as a way
to share equipment and human resources. Consequently, hospitals
evolved into the primary location for healthcare. 21 Since many physicians
moved their practices to hospitals, patients were expected to pay for
hospital services, even in charitable hospitals. Regardless of this change,
hospitals have generally
continued to provide some level of care to those
22
who can not afford it.
Medical technology and practices were not alone in this evolutionary
process. Notably, the ideological concept of charity was transformed from

14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
15. JAMES

384 (2d
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

J.

FISHMAN

&

STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

ed. 2000).
See generally Chestek, supra note 13, at 24.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See generally Chestek, supra note 13, at 24.
See Id.
See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 111, supra note 3.
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"relief of the poor '23 to "community benefit., 24 Yet, throughout this
change, the idea of providing healthcare services as a form of charity went
unquestioned. In the general law of charity, the promotion of health is
considered a charitable purpose. 21 Clearly satisfying the exempt purpose
requirement, a healthcare provider must also meet the other requirements
outlined
in Section 501(c)(3) in order to receive and maintain the exempt
26
status.
In addition to merely having an exempt purpose, the organization's
27
primary activities must be designed to accomplish that purpose.
Therefore, exempt entities must be "[o]rganized and operate exclusively"
so that the public or charitable interest prevails over any private interest. 28
The assets of the organization must be substantially used to further the
charitable purpose. Thus, an exempt healthcare provider must conduct a
substantial portion of its business activities to provide a benefit to the
community, which in this case is the promotion of health.
Another requirement for tax exemption under the Code is that no
private shareholder or individual may inure a benefit 29 from the
organization's net earnings. ° A "private shareholder or individual" is a
person having a personal and private interest in the activities of the
organization." If an exempt organization violates the private benefit or
23. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1969-2 C.B. 202. An organization's ability to
provide relief to the poor is a key factor in determining its tax-exempt status.
24. During this time, Medicare and Medicaid programs commenced, greatly
affecting the healthcare industry and the role of the government and charities as
providers. See also Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506
F.2d 1278 (1974); SANDERS, supra note 7, at 329; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov.

21, 1991).

25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS, §§ 368, 372 (1957).
26. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
27. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1986).
28. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1986).

29. "Private inurement" is an impressible transaction involving an individual
inside the organization, such as a director, manager or any related party receiving
assets from the organization in anything less than an arm's length transaction. See
United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). "Private
benefit" is the term used when an exempt organization operates substantially to
benefit outside private interest. See generally Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92
T.C. 1053 (1989).
30. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(e) (2001).
31. See Treas. Reg. §1.501(a)-(1)(c) (2001).
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private inurement restriction, its tax-exempt status may be revoked."
Joint ventures bring additional attention to the possibility of exempt
healthcare providers violating this prohibition. "The private inurement
doctrine forbids ways of causing income or assets of a healthcare
organization from flowing away from the organization and to or for the
benefit of one or more persons with some significant relationship to the
organization."33 If a joint venture is not carefully structured between a
for-profit entity and an exempt entity, 4 the actions of the exempt
organization may be providing additional benefits to a private individual,"
including but not limited to the for-profit entity and its officers and
directors.
As the demand for providing quality healthcare at lower costs
increases, healthcare providers are turning to large-scale operations in the
hopes of meeting this demand, while still maintaining a stable financial
situation. Joint ventures provide a common solution to the economic and
fiscal problems faced by both for-profit and nonprofit entities. The
agreements between these two organizations must satisfy both the desire
and expectation of income by the for-profit investors and the
requirements laid out in Section 501(c)(3) for the benefit of the nonprofit
entity.

32. See Ancolte Psychiatric Ctr. v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 374 (1992). The IRS may
impose an excise tax in addition to or in place of the revocation of the exempt
status. Under the IRC, "intermediate sanctions" are imposed on organizations
that engage in and its managers who authorize an excess benefit transaction. The
Intermediate sanctions can be very steep. Persons who engage in these prohibited
activities with a § 501(c)(3) organization are taxed on twenty-five percent of the
amount of the excess benefit received. This tax may increase to two hundred
percent if the transaction is not corrected. A manager is subject to a ten percent
tax, if he authorizes a transaction that he knows is an excess benefit transaction.
See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1)-(2), (b).
33. HYATr & HOPKINS, supra note 5, §4.1, at 56.
34. An exempt organization participating in a joint venture may be engaging
in private inurement if the for-profit partner receives additional compensation or
allocations of the profits, e.g., if a physician receives a reduced rental rate, or if a
hospital does not receive adequate consideration on the sale of its assets. This list
is not exhaustive. See SANDERS, supra note 7, at 342.
35. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991). "The inurement prohibition
serves to prevent anyone in a position to do so from siphoning off any of a
charity's income or assets for personal use." Id.
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II.

THE EVOLUTION OF NONPROFIT JOINT VENTURES

Prior to 1982, the IRS prohibited nonprofit entities from entering into
an agreement with for-profit entities.16 This per se incompatibility rule
was reasoned on two principles.37 First, the maximization of the financial
interests of the for-profit partners would be viewed as the primary
motivation driving the nonprofit's actions, because the nonprofit has a
legal duty to do so, serving as a general partner." Hence, the organization
would be in direct violation of Section 501(c)(3), which requires exclusive
operation in furtherance of its exempt purpose. 39 Second, the mere fact
that a for-profit entity would share in the net-profits of a joint venture's4
0
activities is in violation of the prohibition of inuring private benefit.
Without a prevailing charitable purpose, the organization would lose its
tax exemption.
Furthermore, the exempt organization would be serving as a general
partner in the joint venture. Because a general partner is exposed to
unlimited liability, not only is the investment in the joint venture at risk,
but also all of the assets of the exempt organization. 4' This additional
exposure accentuates the concern of the IRS, the donors of the assets,42
and the community at large.
If an exempt organization does not want to assume the risks that
accompany a general partner, it can invest as either a limited partner or a
non-managing investor.43 In this role, the exempt organization does not
have a fiduciary obligation to the for-profit partners and does not risk

36. See generally Plumstead Theatre Society v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980),
affd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). The Tax Court found that a tax-exempt

organization serving as a general partner was " no more intrusive or indicative of
private interests than [a] contractual percentage arrangement." Id. at 1334.

37. David M. Flynn, Tax Court's Decision in Redlands Provides Limited
Endorsementfor IRS Position on Joint Ventures, 91 J. TAX'N 241 (1999).

38. See id at 242.
39. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293 (May 30, 1975).
40. See Flynn, supra note 37, at 241.

41. See REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACr §306 (1997); See also UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP Acr §§303, 403 (1976 as amended 1985).

42. A taxpayer may deduct charitable contributions donated to organizations,
which are granted exemption under Section 501(c)(3). See I.R.C. § 170 (2001).
43. See generally Michael Sanders, New Horizon for Nonprofits: How to
Structure Joint Ventures with For-Profits,Bus. L. TODAY, Aug. 9, 2000, at 53.
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unlimited exposure of its assets. 44 An exempt organization may invest in a
partnership that does not advance its charitable purpose as long as the
interest is "insubstantial" to the exempt organization's overall
investments or activities.
If the activity does not relate to the
organization's exempt purpose, the organization may be obligated to pay
46
tax on any income received. While it is possible for an exempt
organization to be a limited partner in a joint venture, additional
uncertainty arises when the exempt organization is a general partner.
A.

Permissibilityof Joint Ventures

When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding in Plumstead
Theatre Society v. Commissioner 7 the IRS was forced to reconsider its
absolute ban on joint ventures. 48 In Plumstead,difficulties in raising funds
for its exempt activities caused a nonprofit theater company to enter into
a limited partnership as the general partner with several for-profit
investors that were serving as limited partners.4 9 The limited partners had
the majority share of the net earnings, but this detail had no impact on the
court's holding.: The court was convinced that the transaction was
performed at arm's length and was no more incurring a private benefit
than contractual percentage agreements previously approved by the
courts." Ultimately, the theatre company's control over the activities of
the joint venture became the factor that allowed joint ventures to occur.
"The limited partners have no control over the way [the nonprofit]
operates or manages its affairs, and none of the limited partners.., is an
officer or director of the [charitable organization]." 2 Although the facts
of Plumsteadinvolve a theater company, the holding can be applied to the

44. See id.
45. See I.R.C. § 513; Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (2001).
46. See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.511-1 (2001). A tax-exempt entity
has an obligation to pay tax on income that is generated from an activity that is
unrelated to its exempt purpose. This tax is commonly known as unrelated
business income tax (UBIT).
47. See Plumstead, 74 T.C. 1324.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1328.
51. See id. at 1334, (citing Broadway Theatre League of Lynchburg, Va. v.
United States., 293 F.Supp. 346 (W.D.Va.1968)).
52. See id.
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structures of all joint ventures entered into by exempt organizations,
including healthcare entities. If a nonprofit entity is able to dictate that
the activities of the joint venture be charitable, a for-profit investment in
the capital accounts should be merely incidental to the 501(c)(3) status.
B.

Facts and Circumstance Test

As a result of the court's holding in Plumstead, the Service adopted a

fact and circumstance analysis of the newly forming joint ventures. The
analysis is based on a two-prong test 3 First, the activities of the
14
partnership must be in furtherance of the tax-exempt purpose.
A
nonprofit entity must continue to earn its tax-exempt status by conducting
activities that benefit the community. The tax-exemption is not in
jeopardy solely because an organization distributes a portion of its profits
to private investors.
The second prong examines the exempt
organization's flexibility in the partnership agreement to operate
exclusively in furtherance of its charitable purpose." Through this prong,
the IRS determines the impact of the exempt organization's control over
the activities of its ventures and the extent of the inurement to private
investors.
This new approach to nonprofit and for-profit business agreements
changed the structure of healthcare organizations. Through the issuance
of a series of private letter rulings and general counsel memoranda, the
IRS has permitted these agreements in either partnerships or other forms
of joint ventures involving numerous healthcare related activities. An
ambulatory surgical center, a substance abuse treatment center, magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) services, an acute medical rehabilitation
hospital, a gastroenterology laboratory and a kidney dialysis and
treatment center were just some of the business
• ••
56 entities that emerged as a
result of for-profit and nonprofit participation.
In 1992, the IRS published examination guidelines to be used by agents
53. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-07-022 (Nov. 22, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
(Jan. 29, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-21-055 (Feb. 26, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
(May 20, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-52-030 (Oct. 08, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
(Nov. 30, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-05-029 (Nov. 06, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
(May 20, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-35-072 (June 07, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
(Feb. 26, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-05-089 (Nov. 07,1986).

88-17-039
88-33-038
93-08-034
88-33-038
88-20-093
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during hospital audits to determine if the organization is meeting both the
community benefit standard and limiting the private inurement." In
serving the community, hospitals should have the following attributes: (1)
an "open staff policy"; (2) a full-time emergency room open to everyone;58
(3) acceptance of Medicare and Medicaid; (4) availability of nonemergency services; and (5) overall community involvement. 9 According
to the IRS, these five policies that may be implemented by a healthcare
provider are the favorable factors needed to satisfy the first prong of the
facts and circumstance test.
The guidelines also included the following factors that would indicate
private benefits: (1) research obligations benefiting the private parties and
not the public; (2) "excessive compensation"; (3) "loan agreements at less
than prevailing interest rates;" and (4) "supplies or services are
provided.., at preferred terms" by the charitable organization.'o These
situations give a for-profit investor benefits from the activities performed
by the nonprofit partner. The question remains as to what extent these
factors must be met.
C.

Need for Control

After implementing the facts and circumstance test, the IRS consented
to joint ventures between nonprofit and for-profit entities. Housing
Pioneers v. Commissioner" marks the first limitation to the IRS condoned
joint ventures.
In Housing Pioneers, the charitable healthcare
organization participated as a one percent general partner in a limited
partnership with for-profit investors. 62 The court never reached the
analysis regarding the second prong of the test, the control of the
agreement, because the agreement never passed the first prong. 63 The
agreement failed, "because its proposed activities included at least one

57. See IRS Exempt Organization Examination Guidelines for Hospitals,
Ann 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59. §333 (June 1, 1992).
58. An open emergency room is not required but often helps. See id. and see
also Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
59. See IRS Exempt Organization Examination Guidelines for Hospitals at
§333.1.
60. See id. at §333.2.
61. See Housing Pioneers v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. 2191 (1993), affd, 49 F.3d

1995, amended by 58 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1995).
62. See Housing Pioneers v. Comm'r, 58 F.3d 401, 403 (9h Cir. 1995).
63. See id.
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non-exempt purpose which was 'substantial in nature." '64 While this case
may seem irrelevant to healthcare organizations, which traditionally have
provided charitable services, the holding allowed the IRS to switch its
focus from the first prong to scrutinizing the factors of the second prong
of the facts and circumstance test.
Within three years, the IRS began to examine the need for control in
65
two private letter rulings regarding healthcare providers. In the first, the
IRS was content with the purchase of a 62.5 percent interest in a LLC by
two exempt healthcare organizations 66 because physicians, who did not
serve as officers or directors in either organization, owned the remaining
interest. 67 The purchasing agreement called for an arm's length
transaction and proportionate allocations of the LLC 's earnings and
liability. 68 In addition, the LLC had policies and guidelines for the
operation of the outpatient dialysis center, which constituted its business
activity. 69
In the second letter ruling, however, the IRS had some concern with7
0
the nonprofit's lack of control as provided in the partnership agreement.
The organizations agreed to amend the agreement, which gave the charity
substantive authority and revoked a security agreement, thus
compromising the prohibition on private inurement.7 ' After these changes
the exempt status was no longer in danger."
Through the release of private letter rulings73 and audit guidelines, the
IRS has continually expressed the importance of the exempt
organization's ability to control the activities of any venture in which the
assets of the charity are invested. This is especially true when the exempt
64. Id. at 402.
65. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-37-050 (June 18, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039
(June 9, 1997).
66. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-37-050 (June 18, 1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (June 9, 1997).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. The IRS is bound only to the holding in the Private Letter Rulings for the
individual to whom the ruling was issued. While private letter rulings may not be
cited as authoritative, these letter rulings provide an understanding to the IRS's
position on a certain issue. See I.R.C. § 6110 (k)(3) (2001).
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74
organization serves as the general partner in a newly formed partnership
or the managing member of a LLC.

III. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF COMMON HOSPITAL JOINT VENTURES
Joint ventures have been common place among healthcare-providing
entities. "Because the healthcare sector of the economy has been the
most dynamic area involving [exempt organizations] on a large scale,
many of the new and different types of joint venture transactions have
involved tax-exempt healthcare organizations. ''75 To understand fully the
nonprofit's ability to control the organization, the structural details of a
particular transaction can be a significant factor in the IRS's future ruling.
"Whole-hospital joint ventures," as indicated by the number of requests
for private letter rulings received by the IRS,76 and "ancillary joint
ventures" have emerged as popular arrangements for the joint ventures.
A.

Whole HospitalJoint Ventures

In a whole hospital joint venture, the exempt entity is able to contribute
its assets to the joint venture, provided its goal is to further the taxexempt purpose of the entity.?7 In many cases, the hospital's assets will be
transferred to the newly formed entity. The for-profit organization
manages the day-to-day operations of the venture, 8 while the nonprofit
does not take part in healthcare services. However, the nonprofit entity
does receive distributions based on its percentage of ownership in the
venture.79 The nonprofit organization contributes additional capital to
ensure the performance of the charitable healthcare aims.8° The nonprofit
maneuvers its assets to further its tax-exempt purpose through its
positions on the board of directors of the newly formed venture. The forprofit organization receives assets necessary to run a hospital at a

74. See discussion supra Section II.

75. Flynn, supra note 37, at 242.
76. See id.
77. See THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 2000 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 104 (John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. 2000).

78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
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reasonable rate of return.'] A whole hospital joint venture can be a
beneficial vehicle to the success of both the for-profit and nonprofit
entities.
The IRS addressed the whole hospital venture in Revenue Ruling 9815. 82 This was only the second revenue ruling issued addressing
healthcare entities since 1986. 8'
Consistent with the fact-and-circumstance analysis that emerged in this
area, the ruling is comprised of two joint venture scenarios. 84 The first
situation describes an agreement that meets the IRS expectations for a
joint venture under § 501(c)(3).85 The agreement described in the second
situation falls short of satisfying the expectations of the IRS.M If an
organization has facts synonymous with either situation described in the
ruling, then the maintenance or revocation of its tax-exempt status can be
easily inferred. However, uncertainty arises when the fact patterns fall
somewhere in the middle."'
The two proposed situations begin with similar fact patterns. A taxexempt hospital forms a LLC with a for-profit corporation in the hopes of
obtaining additional funding to serve the community.8 To do so, the
nonprofit contributes its hospital assets and other operating assets in
return for an ownership interest proportional and equal to the
contribution in the newly formed LLC. 89 A for-profit entity, willing to
finance the hospital, expects to earn a reasonable rate of return on its
investment. It also contributes assets in exchange for a proportional and
equal interest. 90 The earnings and distribution of the LLC are made in
proportion to the ownership interests. 91 The nonprofit agrees to award
grants to promote the health of the community, including healthcare to
those that cannot afford it, with the profit it receives from the joint

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
See generally Rev. Rut. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
See HYATr & HOPKINS, supra note 77, at 104-105.
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
See id.
See id.
See HYATr & HOPKINS, supra note 77, at 110.
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 719.
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venture. 9' The legal and financial arrangement, stated above, is common
to both situations found in the ruling. 93
In contrast, discrepancies exist between the two situations, which are
significant enough to warrant revocation of tax-exempt status. The
difference appears in three areas: governance, management, and decisionmaking authority. 94 While the board of governance shall consist of both
for-profit and nonprofit appointees in both scenarios, the significant
factor is the number of governors each owner can appoint.9 In situation
one, the governing board consists of three individuals chosen by the96
nonprofit partner and two individuals chosen by the for-profit partner.
The nonprofit has an outright majority of the board. In situation two, the
governing board consists of three delegates from each owner. 97 "Because
[the nonprofit] will share control of [the LLC] with [the for-profit], [the
nonprofit] will not be able to initiate programs within [the joint venture]
without the agreement of at least one governing board member appointed
by [the for-profit]." 98 Convinced that the for-profit entity will put its
business enterprise before the tax-exempt purpose, the Service held the
structure of the board threatened the "furtherance of an exempt purpose"
requirement. 99
In situation two, presented with an equal number of board members
from or appointed by each partner, the tax-exempt organization has the
authority to strike down any provisions asserted by its for-profit
counterparts.1 However, the nonprofit does not maintain enough control
because "a majority controlled board can initiate actions in furtherance of
the charitable purpose while an evenly divided board cannot."10 1 The
requirement of a ratio in favor of the exempt organization indicates the

92. See id.
93. See Douglas M. Mancino, New Ruling Provides Guidance, Raises
Questions for Joint Ventures Involving Exempt Organizations, 88 J. TAX'N 294
(1998).
94. See id.
95. See generally Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
101. Bruce John Shih & Daniel K. Settlemayer, Joint Ventures Rev. Rul. 9815: Don't Apply Blindly, 10 HEALTH L. 8, 12 (1998).
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importance in ensuring that the joint venture will exist to provide
community benefit and not private gain.
In both situations, the day-to-day management of the LLC will be
determined through a management agreement.'9 In situation one, the
contracting company cannot be related to either owner, and the ability to
renew the contract is done only with mutual consent of both owners.103
However, the management agreement in situation two is somewhat
different. Instead of an arm's length agreement, a subsidiary of the forprofit entity provides the day-to-day operations of the LLC.' "
Furthermore,t .the
- 105"renewal" provision places the discretion in the hands
of the subsidiary.
The Service contends that control is to be a deciding factor throughout
the entire structure of the organization. Thus, the actual operation of the
joint venture, in addition to the board of governance, must be controlled
by the nonprofit.' °
The charitable purpose must be the primary
motivation behind the actions of the LLC.' °7 To be sure that the
operating management contributes to this purpose, the nonprofit must
have the capability to control the management company.
Control in
this sense can be determined through factors such as the independence of
the company,'0 9 the ability to remove the company for cause and the
length of the contract."0 The greater the control, the more secure the
exempt status will be.
The decision-making authority of the first LLC is limited in several
capacities. First, the governing documents explicitly demand that the
LLC operates its hospitals to further the "charitable purpose by
promoting health for a broad cross section of the community.'
Second,
102. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
103. See id.
104. See id.

105. See id.
106. See generally Michael I. Sanders, New Horizon for Nonprofits, Bus. L.
TODAY, Aug. 9, 2000 at 53.

107. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c)(1) (1986).
108. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
109. The Service, presumably, would not have any problem if the
management company was related to the nonprofit.

110. In the second situation, the contract would run for ten years before the
nonprofit would have the chance to exert any substantive influence.
111. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
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this duty to the community prevails over the duty to the owners regarding
financial returns. 112 Without the former provision, the "[LLC] will be able
to deny care to segments of the community, such as the indigent."'' 3 This
latter provision directly confronts the concern regarding a duty to increase
profits for the investors that the Service expressed in Plumstead.'1
Furthermore, the decisions that must be handled by the board of
governance, not the management company, are limited in the second
situation. Both situations require approval by the board for budgets,
distributions of earnings and the selection of key executives. However,
the first situation requires that any acquisition or distribution of facilities,
contracts above a certain dollar amount and changes to the services
offered be presented before the board of governance," 5 thereby providing
the nonprofit with additional control of the management company and
the activities of the organization. While the second situation includes a
provision for the board to decide "unusually large contracts,"
uncertainty
16
arises as to which contracts actually meet that requirement. 1
The relevant facts and circumstances outlined in Revenue Ruling 98-15
will give nonprofit entities some guidance as to "participation in [a]
partnership [that] furthers a charitable purpose, and... permits the
exempt organization to act exclusively in furtherance of its exempt
11 7
purpose and only incidentally for the benefit of the for-profit partners."
However, guidance is not provided for factual patterns that fall between
these two scenarios.
B.

Ancillary Joint Ventures

Generally, ancillary joint ventures are not as complex as whole hospital
joint ventures. In this type of venture, a nonprofit entity transfers assets
to be used in the newly formed healthcare facility, or contributes funds for
its establishment."8 While the nonprofit retains other assets to operate

112. See id.
113. Id. at 721.
114. See Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980),
affd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
115. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 721.
116. See id.
117. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718 (citing Plumstead, 74 T.C. 1324, and
Housing Pioneers v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 2191 (1993)).
118. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 15, at 494.
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other healthcare facilities,"' the for-profit maintains the same role as in a
whole-hospital joint venture. The for-profit investor merely contributes
cash equal to the nonprofit's asset contributions.2 0 With an ancillary joint
venture, the nonprofit's activities do not focus on the joint venture.
"[Tihe activity conducted by the exempt organization through the joint
venture arrangement is generally not the sole activity of the exempt
organization, and it may not be a substantial part of the organization's
activities."' 2' The nonprofit does not deposit all of its assets into the
newly formed entity and it maintains an additional outlet to conduct
activities in furtherance of its exempt purpose.
In Redlands SurgicalServices v. Commissioner,22 a tax-exempt hospital,
Redland Health Systems, created a wholly-owned subsidiary that entered
into a general partnership with a for-profit entity. 2 3 The general
partnership owned an interest as general partner in a limited partnership
that operated an ambulatory surgical center. In summary, the subsidiary
of the tax-exempt hospital "owned 46 percent 124 of a 61 percent"' interest
in an ambulatory surgical center.' ' 26 The subsidiary served merely as a
shell to hold the joint venture for the hospital. The only asset the
subsidiary held was an interest in the surgical center; likewise, the surgical
center was the subsidiary's only source of income.12 Furthermore, the
hospital's president performed double duties as the president of the
subsidiary.
The court examined the claim under a fact and circumstances analysis

119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.

122. Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999).
123. Id. at 48. The subsidiary, Redlands Surgical Services, was formed to
enter the general partnership, in the hopes of limiting the liability exposure.
124. Id. at 50. SCA Centers, a publicly traded, for-profit entity, owned the
remaining fifty-four percent interest.
125. Id. at 49. The remaining thirty-nine percent of the limited partnership
was owned by Inland Surgery Center Limited Partnership, an entity consisting of
thirty partners who were physicians on the staff of Redlands Hospital.
126. Stanley G. Andeel, Techniques in Forming and Representing
Physician/BusinessJoint Venture, SE66 ALI-ABA 199, 228, Feb. 17, 2000.
127. See Redlands, 113 T.C. at 65.
128. Id.
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and denied the organization's petition for tax-exempt status. 29 The lack
of an obligation toward a charitable purpose by the general partnership
discouraged the court from issuing a favorable holding for the joint
venture.3 In addition, the joint venture failed to give the nonprofit the
ability to control the voting power or any other device that would ensure
furtherance of the charitable purpose.' 3' Similar to situation two in
Revenue Ruling 98-15,132 the day-to-day operations were controlled by the
for-profit partner.33 Finally, the agreement between the for-profit and
nonprofit contained competitive restrictions and market advantages that
indicated a profit-making agenda and not a community benefit.3 4 As the
court stated, "[it] is difficult to conceive of a significant charitable purpose
that would be furthered by such [restrictions]."'35 Specifically, the court
indicated that no factor was determinative, holding that: "Taken in their
totality, these factors compel the conclusion that... [the charitable
'
organization] impermissibly serves private interests."136
Conclusively, the
totality of the circumstances was the key factor in the
court deciding that
7
the organization never held itself out as charitable.
While Revenue Ruling 98-15 is only enforceable upon whole hospital
arrangements 38 and the Redlands Case has a direct impact on ancillary
ventures, 39 the two recent developments can be taken together to
examine the Service's and the courts' position on the future of taxexemption in the healthcare arena.
CONCLUSION

For the past twenty years, the tax-exemption law has reflected an
129. See id.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id. at 78-79.
See id at 79.
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
See Redlands, 113 T.C. at 81-82.
See id at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 93.

137. See id.

138. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. The enforceability of Revenue
Rulings upon the IRS is contingent on the facts presented. A variation, such as a
different type of joint venture, may lose its binding effect.
139. See Redlands, 113 T.C. at 47.
140. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; See also Redlands, 113 T.C. at 47.
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understanding of the importance of prosperity in the healthcare industry.
"The growth of private and employer-provided health insurance and the
introduction ...
of government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid
altered the economics of the healthcare sector and transformed the
American hospital.' 4' To reflect this trend, the Service and the courts
have allowed joint• •ventures
between nonprofits and for-profits to form
142
with few restrictions.
Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Redlands set the
limitations on the government's willingness to allow a metamorphosis of
the tax-exemption law in a traditionally charitable industry.
It is true that a joint venture between a for-profit and nonprofit can be
successful while the nonprofit maintains its exempt status. Revenue
Ruling 98-15 provides a "safe harbor" in situation one.'" The IRS will
accept entities that arrange the venture with similar governance
provisions to situation one.1'4 However, the arrangements that do not
appear to match this structure have no guarantees.
In reality, the whole-hospital ventures have been structured as a cross
between these two examples. Thus, the format of the currently issued
guidance provides little assistance to entities contemplating a joint
venture. "'[T]he good example and the bad example are so far apart that
it leaves most of the real world deals somewhere in between."1 46 For
example, most joint ventures of this type use a management company
connected with a for-profit entity, as seen in situation two.147 "It is the
expertise and success record of the for-profit companies that is being
sought in these ventures."'1'
In addition, the requirement that the
nonprofit's members be a majority of the board of directors is unrealistic.
Current transactions typically have equal representation or require a

141. FISHMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 384.
142. The Service maintained that net revenue joint ventures were private
inurement per se and thus prohibited tax-exempt organizations from participating.
143. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; see generally Redlands, 113 T.C. at
47.
144. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, C.B. 1998-1.
145. Revenue Rulings bind the IRS to the position that it takes in the revenue

provided that the facts are mirror images.
146. Barbara Yuill, Healthcare: Unwind Of Columbia Joint Venture in
Virginia a First But Likely Not the Last, Experts Say, DAILY TAX REPORT, Feb. 12,
1999, at J-2.
147. See HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 77, at 109.
148. Id.
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supermajority vote. In either case, the tax-exempt owner, with only a
standard majority, lacks the power to control the board as is
recommended by the provisions of Revenue Ruling 98-15.49
This lack of certainty has already had an impact in the business world.
A whole-hospital joint venture between Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corporation, a for-profit entity, and the Arlington Healthcare Systems, a
nonprofit, was cancelled because the IRS failed to issue an approval of
the transaction."" While approximately twenty-four whole-hospital joint
ventures are in existence, half involve Columbia as the for-profit
investor; 5' presumably, many take a similar form to the Arlington joint
venture. Given the level of scrutiny proclaimed in Revenue Ruling 98-15,
many ventures will not survive the fact-and-circumstance analysis, which
must be extremely favorable to the nonprofit entities. 1 2 While the
issuance of the ruling was a gesture of guidance,' the only direction
actually provided was a "golden ticket"' 5 4 hidden in a set of
unascertainable facts.
If the recent litigation is supposed to help exempt organizations, there
will be much disappointment. In Redlands, the Tax Court, with an
affirmation on appeal, allied with the IRS as it examined a nonprofit's
ability to maintain effective control over its operations.'
The court did
not take as strict a position as the Service, choosing instead to look at the
totality of the circumstances, thus allowing more room for joint ventures
to take place. 116 Nonetheless, an organization must again attempt to
weigh the specific factors 117 the court addresses with no real understanding
as to the characteristics needed to satisfy the requirements of § 501(c)(3).

149. See id.
150. See Yuill, supra note 146, at J-1.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See HYATr & HOPKINS, supra note 77, at 110.
154. See Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory (Warner Bros. Family
Entertainment 1971). A famous candymaker, Willie Wonka, randomly hides five
golden tickets in candy bars. If a child finds a golden ticket wrapped around the
candy bar he purchased, he wins a tour of Wonka's candy factory and the
possibility of inheriting his candy fortune.
155. See Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 47, 92 (1999).
156. See id. at 92-93 (finding that effective control could be reached without
voting control; however, the totality of circumstances must be examined).
157. See discussion infra Section III, Part B.
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The reasoning behind the agreements between both for-profit and
nonprofit organizations allows each entity the most effective way to meet
their financial needs. As suggested by the number of requests for private
letter rulings regarding joint ventures from the IRS indicates that parties
118
believe this type of arrangement will be beneficial to both sides.
Unfortunately, a failure in attempting to form a joint venture can further
add stress to the financial burden already experienced by nonprofits.
Millions of dollars are invested in creating the joint venture, which
ultimately may be thrown away because of an adverse decision by the IRS
or the courts. 59 In light of Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Redlands , the
attractiveness of the arrangement has diminished.1 6 The nonprofit will
have a difficult time finding a for-profit entity that is willing to surrender
control of the venture without receiving compensation for its sacrifice.
Purchasing the control needed under the current analysis will greatly
reduce the financial rewards the nonprofit was seeking to reap.161
Through both Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Redlands, nonprofit entities
have a clear understanding of what not to do. 62 The borders outlining
what will constitute an appropriate activity under the tax-exempt
provisions have been established, and it is clear that certain agreements
will lie outside those borders. However, by not providing a more detailed
location of that perimeter, healthcare entities are forced to blindly choose
to be in or out. As a result, some joint ventures will not be formed, some
nonprofit entities will convert to for-profit entities, and some § 501(c)(3)
organizations will lose their exempt status. By not taking a clear position,
the IRS and the courts have indicated that tax-exemption is a reward for
those who work to clearly add a benefit to the community. With
understanding that healthcare entities need to be operated effectively and
efficiently, thus requiring additional resources, private investors may be
able to save the nonprofit healthcare organizations. However, it cannot
be done at the expense of their tax-exemption status.

158. See Yuill, supra note 146, at J-2.
159. See id.

160. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; See also Redlands, 113 T.C. at 47.
161. See Yuill, supra note 146, J-2.
162. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; See Redlands, 113 T.C. at 47.

